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THE SCHOOL.
The following officers have been elected
in the Dickinson Society:
President-B. Johnston MacEwen.
Vice President-William M. Flanigan.
Secretary-Harry "M. Collins.
CriticSergt.-at-Arms-Lawrence M. Sebring.
The treasurer being elected but twice
each collegiate year, the present incumbent
holds over until the next regular election
at the close of the term.
In the recent baseball game between
Dickinson College and Mercersburg, in
which the score was 25 to 1 in the former's
favor, Russell, of the Junior class, pitched
a star game. Mr. Russell is a first-class
pitcher now, and before the end of the
season, will doubtless develop into an invincible twirler of the sphere.
Lentz, of the Junior class, is busily engaged in making cuts for the college Microcosm.
Since the first of April, the Seniors and
Middle men have been sitting as judges in
the moot courts. This is another excellent
feature of the Dickinson moot court system,
as these men who have been obtaining practice in argument, while acting as counsel,
during the previous part of the year, will

now consider the cases from a judicial
standpoint, thus gaining development on
both sides of legal suits and actions. Each
judge is required to hahd down a written
opinion, from which an appeal may be
taken to the Dean, who sits as Judge of the
Supreme Court.
The Juniors have finished theii"course in
assigned estates in Practice under Judge
Sadler, and are now preparing the papers
in decedents' estates.
The following men of the law school are
competitors for athletic honom:
Russel and Rothermel on the baseball
team.
Mearkle is training for the high jump.
Taylor is on the relay team.
Sloan and O'Keefe are throwing the
hammer.
Light and Henderson are putting the
shot.

Rothermel makes an ideal second baseman. He played on the Lafayette college
team before coming to Dickinson.
President Long of the Middle class has
appointed the following men as a committee on invitations, caps and gowns, &c., for
commencement:
Landis, chairman, Sypherd, Wolf, Bos-
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ler, and Moyer. President Hare of the
Senior class appointed Jordan to serve with
this committee.
The Dickinson College Glee Club and
Orchestra appeared recently in Wilmington. Of the concert, an alumnus of the
law school writes, that "Hare, one of the
law school men, carried the house by storm,
with two songs. All remembered him
from Jast year."

of Bedford county. Since leaving Carlisle,
Mr. Biddle has been meeting with exceptional success in the practice of the law,
and being a competent and deserving
young man, the FoRum wishes him success in his candidacy.
Martin Herr, '98, will appear before the
New Jersey State board examining committee, at Trenton, in June.

The short Easter vacation was appreciated by all of the students, many of whom
took advantage of this opportunity to
make a flying trip home.

Snyder, '98, was in Carlisle, the first of
the month, on legal business. Mr. Snyder
expects to enter the practice in Northumberland county, in the near future.

On Tuesday evening, March 21st, Presiand Mrs. Geo. Edward Reed tendered
their annual reception to the Senior and
Middle classes of the law school. These
receptions of the president and his wi'e,
,are among the most delightful, and most
looked forward to occasions of the winter,
the reputation of both the host and hostess
as entertainers beingsuch, that all who attend these functions, may be assured of a
very delightful and entertaining evening,
and this evening certainly sustained their
reputation. A large number of the young
ladies from the town and college were
present, which added to the pleasure of
the evening. During the evening, the
company was entertained by several recitations by Miss Radle of the Law School,
and Miss Eva Fisherof the town while Dr.
and Mrs. Reed and Mr. Hare, sang several
selections The whole company joined in
singing college songs and melodies.
Among those present were, Miss Radle,
Miss Marvel, Miss Herman, Miss McKeefhan, Miss Horn, Miss Annie Sellars, Miss
Helen Horn, Miss Ream, Miss Eva Fisher,
Miss Himes,Miss Hoffman, Miss Haddock,
Miss Vandewater, Misses McMillen, Miss
Houck, Dr. Trickett, Messrs. MacEwen,
Long, John, Wolf, Sypherd, Moyer, Siegrist, Jordan, Sheeline, Henry, Walter
Taylor, Hare, Laubenstein, Stevens, Vale,
Oiler, Freed, Schuyler, and Professors
Sadler, Woodward and Mills.

Rochow, '96, has hung out hisshingle in
York, where lie is accumulating a very
gratifying practice.

ALUIANI.
Mr. Joseph Biddle, Law '97, is one of the
prominent candidates for district attorney

Jere S. Oinwake, of Shippensburg, h1es
purchased a full set of the Pennsylvania
State reports. Mr. Orwake has been interested in some very important cases in
Cumberland county, during the recent
courts.
Beritheisel, '98, wa8 a recent visitor in
town.
Charles E. Daniels, of Scranton, was in
Carlisle recently. He was formerly a student at the law school and was a member
of the committee to welcome home the 13th
Regiment at Scranton.-Carlisle Sentinel.

MOOT COURT.
DUNNING vs. COLLETT.
Distress for rent-Exemption of pianos
from-Irregular proceedings-Sale on
th, twelfth day following notice of-It
replevin, the plaintiffmust show that he
had a present right of possession-Title
of purchaser at prematuresale.
Replevin.
A. FRANK JoHN and L. HILDREWrH fo'
the plaintiff.
1. Distraint and sale of piano illegal, as
statute exempts organs, pianos and melodeons. Brightly's Pur. Dig. 834; McGeary v. Mellor, 87 Pa. 401.
2. The piano was unlawfully seized by
the.landlord, the same not having comne
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into the possession of the tenant .until
three days after the levy had teen madeWard v. Taylor, I Pa. 238; Furbush v.
Chappell, 105 Pa. 187: Kerr v. Sharp, 14
S. & R. 399.
ISAIAH SHEELINE and T. M. MCOACHRAN for defendant.
1. To maintain the action of replevin
there must be a present right of possession.
Lake Shore v. Ellsen, 85 Pa. 283; Lester
v. McDowell, 18 Pa. 91; Miller v. Warden,
lII Pa. 300.
2. The piano was not exempt as it does
not appear.that notice had been given to
the landlord that it was leased. Act of
May 13, 1876, P. L. 171; MeGeary v Mellor,87 Pa. 46.
It. The defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value. Duncan v. McCandles ,
2 W. & S. 264.
4. Is not affected by mere irregularities. Wilson v. Howser, 12 Pa. 109; McFee v. Harris, 2.) Pa. 102.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Dunning leased to Thos. Brown a piano
on the 23rd of October, 1898, upon which
Brown was to pay $10.00 per month until
$450.00 had been paid, when Dunning
would make out to Brown a bill of sale
for the said piano. The first payment of
S10 was paid and the piano delivered on
the 24th of October, 1898. Brown was in
arrears to his landlord, and his goods were
levied upon by virtue of a landlord's warrant on the 21st of October, 1898. The
goods were sold on the 31st of October,
1898, and the piano passed by virtue of
said sale to the above-named defendant.
Recovery by the defendant. Motion for
a new trial.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Question has been made by the plaintiff, whether the contract between him
and Brown, was a sale or a bailment, and
he has contended with a large array of
authorities to support him, that it was
the latter, and not the former. We do not
think it important to determine whether
it was a sale or a balment, since in either
case, the piano was, at common law, subject to distress. The general principle 'is,
that any goods of a stranger, if on the demised premises, are liable to a distress for
rent in arrear. Whiting v. Lake, 91 Pa.
349; Price v. McAllister, 3 Gr. 248; Blanche
v. Bradford, 38 Pa. 344. Household furniture in the house, which has been leased

to the tenant, may be distrained on for
his rent. Myers v. Esery, 134 Pa. 177.
The Act of May 13, 1876, 1 P. & L. 2637,
exempts from distress pianos on the premises, leased to the tenant, "provided that
the owner * * shall give notice to the
landlord or his agent, that the instrument
is leased or hired." This notice must be
given before the right of distress matures,
or when the instrument is put on the
premises. McGeary, v. Mellor, 87. Pa.
461. No notice was given to the landlord
by Dunning or any one else. The liability of the piano to seizure in distress,
therefore remained as at common law.
If, therefore, there was no fatal irregularity in the distress proceedings, the sale
to Collett made him the owner of the
piano. The goods of Brown, the tenant,
were levied on, under a landlord's warrant, on October 21, 1898, and were sold
on October 31, 1898. The piano which
was sold with them was not put on the
premises until Oct. 24, 1898. It is evident
therefore, that the proceedings were irregular. After the distress is made, the ten.ant must have five full days in which to
redeem goods by paying the rent. The
appraisement cannot take place until the
sixth day after that on which the notice
of the distress is given. Whitton v. Milligan, 153 Pa. 376; Richards v. McGrath,
100 Pa. 389; McLean v. McCaffrey, 3
Penny. 406; Brisbon v. Wilson, 60 Pa.
452; Rosenberger v. Hallowell, 35 Pa. 369.
The Act of March 21, 1772, 1 P. & L.
2640, directs that, after the appraisement,
the person distraining "shall or may, after
six days' public notice, lawfully sell the
goods and chattels so distrained." This
sale, however, is imperative upon the landlord unless the tenant consents to its omission; Quinn v. Wallace, 6 Wli. 452; Holland v. Townsend, 136 Pa. 392; Richards
v. McGrath, 100 Pa. 389. The sale may
take place on the sixth day after that on
which the notice of it is first given. Thus,
the notice of sale being made on Feb. 7th,
the sale on Feb. 13th, though not too soon,
would, if held sooner, have been invalid;
Whitton v. Milligan, 153 Pa. 376; Holland v. Townsend, 136 Pa. 392. It is evident then, that the sale could not prop6rly
take place until the twelfth day following
that on which the notice of the distress
was given to the tenant. The distress on
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Brown's goods was made on October 21st,
and.they were sold on the tenth following
day.
The sale of the piano was still more irregular. The distress on Brown's goods, had
been made three days before the piano was
delivered to him. Possibly, levy might
then have been made on it, additional to
the one already made, but notice of it to
the tenant would have been necessary.
Six days therefrom must have elapsed, before it was appraised, and five full days
must have intervened between the day of
the appraisement and the day of sale. The
piano was therefore sold five days before it
could have been lawfully sold.
There is no evidence whether the notice
of the distress required by law, was at the
timeof making it, or later, given to the tenant. The constable who made the sale acted
voluntaxily, and as a mere bailiff, prior to
the appraisement. McElroy v. Dice, 17
Pa. 163, and as to what he did, as bailiff,
the presumption is not made (as it would
be as to what he did, under-a duty as constable), that he did what the law required
him to do. Murphy v. Chase, 103 Pa. 260.
We must then probably assume that no
notice was given to the tenant, and we
are informed by the parties, that the sale
has been prematurely held. What is the
effect of this irregularity upon the sale?
Collett became the purchaser Is his title
valid? We have found but little light on
the question.. In Jacob v. King, 5 T-unt,
451, Gibbs, C. J., holds that the tenant
may replevy until the sale, but not after
the sale; Starr v. Simon, 9 Pa. C. C. 15,
but these cases did not involve irregularities in the procedure. In Murphy v.
Chase, 103 Pa. 260, for failure to give the
tenant notice of the distress, it was held
that the purchaser did not acquire a good
title, but the purchaser was the landlord..
Collett is not the landlord, and possibly he
is not to be affected by the irregularities
of the distress.
It is unnecessary, however, to determine
what is the effect on Collett's title, of the
irregularities in the distress. He is the
defendant. In replevin, the plaintiff does
not recover, because he shows that the
defendant has no lawful possession. 20
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1066. He must show
that he had, as against the defendant, the
right of a present possession, when he be.

gan the replevin. 20 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
1050; Strong v. Dinning, 175 Pa. 586; Lake
Shore v. Ellsen, 85 Pa. 283; Miller v. Warden, li Pa. 300. Had then, the plaintiff
the right to the possession when he began
the suit? He had leased or sold the piano
to Brown. Brown acquired the possession
and the right of possession, so long as he
continued to pay the monthly instalments
of $10. The first payment was made when
the piano was delivered on October 24,
1898. When the distress-sale took place,
the right to possess was still in Brown.
That sale did not destroy this right. If
that right passed to Collett, we do not
know whether he has failed to preserve it,
by omitting to make the monthly payments. If it did not pass to Collett, Brown
may, for aught that appears, have made
tender or payment bf the instalments falling due before this replevin was begui.
Dunning has utterly failed to show that
he-had at that time, the right to the possession. For this reason, if for no other,
the verdict for the defendant was proper.
New trial refused.
WEIDMAN vs BURNS.
Gift of safe deposit took- Validity of same.
Assumpsit.
MEARKLE and RUSSErL for plaintiff.

1. Delivery of safe deposit book, standig in name of donor, by donor to donee
is a complete and valid gift if such was the
intention of .the donor. Camp's Appeal,
36 Coun. 88; Kimball v. Leland, 110
Mass. 325; Pierce v. Boston Bank, 129
Ma~s. 425.
2. Gift of a chose in action might be
made inter vivos without writing and by
mere delivery. Estate of Franklin Malone,
13 Phila. 313'; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. 24;
Licey v. Licey, 7 Barr (Pa.) 251.
3. A gift binds the donee's legal representatives as well as himself and after the
death of the donor they cannot refuse recognizingit if completely executed. 8 A. &
B. E. of Law 1340; Van Densur v. Rawley
4 Sedg. (N. Y.) 388.
COBLENTz and BASEHORE for defendant.
1. The delivery of a safe deposit book
containing entries of deposit does not constitute a gift of the value represented
therein unless accompanied by an assignment. Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 117;
Basket v. Hassell, 107 N. S. 602.
2. Money in bank does not pass by de-
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livery of the pass book.
Ryon's Adm. 65 Ky. 230.

Ashbrook

v.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This action is brought by the plaintiff to
recover vhe sum of $1000 from the defendant as administrator of Weston, and individually,which the plaintiff claimsbecame
his property by gift from George Weston,
and which wa* after his decease obtained
and converted by the defendantto his own
use. The gift was made by the delivery of
a safe deposit book, showing deposits to
the amount of $1000. At the time the
book was given, Weston said that he gave
Weidman the book and the property it represented as his property. The money
could only be obtained on presentation of
the book. Burns secured by fraud the
book from Weidman and lifted the deposits.
The suit is brought to recover the
amount.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

If George Weston, during his lifetime,
gave the $1000 to Jacob Weidman, it was
no portion of his estate at his death.
Caleb Burns, neither for himself, nor as
the administrator of Weston, had a right
to receive it.
The intention hereafter to give, is not a
gift. To invest Weidman with the $1000,
it would be necessary, not merely that
Weston had intended to give it to him,
but that in pursuance of this intention he
did an act which might be considered as an
actual'giving.
When the subject of the gift is a chattel,
the characteristic external act of giving is
the delivery, with the donative intent, of
possession of it to the donee. When the
thing given is not a chattel, but an abstract right, it is manifest that as thiN
kind of delivery is impossible, the gift, if
effected at all, must be effected by some
other act. A owes B $1000. The money
thus owed is not specific and identifiable.
A is under an obligation to obtain some
$1000 and to pay it to B. If B then, is to be
permitted to give this right to receive from
A $1000, it is clear that he must not be
compelled to deliver, either some $1000, or
the intangible and abstract right to receive
$1000. In such a case, apparently, the
courts have invented the principle that
the purpose to give must lie manifested by

a writing. The donor must in written
words assign the money, or he must give
a written order upon the debtor to pay the
money over to the donee.
But, many obligations are expressed by
written instruments. The debtor may
have given a bond, a mortgage, a promissory note, a due bill, a policy of insurance.
These are not the debt. They are neither
the creditors' right, nor the debtors' obligation. They are the physical expression
of their existence, or of the promises, etc.,
out of which thiy have sprung. Must the
debt when thus expressed, be given in the
same mode as when it is not thus expressed? In both cases the debt is invisible and intangible, and the money whose
payment will discharge it is undeliverable. Will the instrument so represent
the right that the delivery of it will have
the same eflect as the delivery of a chattel
itself? Or, is it necessary to make and deliver an assignment, or an order upon the
debtor, as in. the ease in which the debt
is not manifested by a document?
A bond can be gratuitously assigned by
mere delivery and without written assignment or endorsement. Licey v. Licey,
7 Pa. 251; Common. v. Crompton, 137 Pa.
138; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366; Bunting
v. Atlantic R. R. Co. 81 Pa. 254. So nay
a promissory note: Scott v. Reed, 153 Pa.
14; or a certificate of stock in a corporation; Commonwealth v. Crompton, 137
Pa. 138; or a check payable to the donor,
Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. 18; or a policy of
insurance upon the life of theAonor, Malone's Estate, 13 Phila. 313; Madeira's Estate, 15 W. N. C. 318; 17 W. N. C. 202.
The delivery of the document with the
orally expressed intention that the debt
represented by it shall henceforth be the
donee's, is an effectual gift. The principle
that there may be a valid gift of securities
without assignment or eadorsement in
writing, has been said to extend to "deposit certificates," 137 Pa. 138: Basket v.
Hassell,'107 U. S. 602.
"Deposit certificates" may be in various
forms. Sometimes they resemble in general appearance a due bill or a promissory
note. Sometimes, they are less formal
but separate memoranda. Sometimes a
book is issued to the depositor, in which
the bank or savings bank, by certain entries, acknowledges itself to have received
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moneys, which it must repay. The book,
with its entries, may not be intended to
be returned to the bank as its voucher,
upon the payment of the sum. In that
case,it is simply evidence furnished by it to
the depositor, with which he need never
part. When such is its nature, it seems
that the delivery of the book with the intention to give to the recipient the money
on deposit, will not make an effectual gift
of the fund. Says Williams, J.," The book
is at most a statement of an account,
showing how much has been deposited by
the customer to be held by the bank upon
the terms which the law or the agreement
between the parties has provided. When
withdrawn, it is by means of checks, orders or such other form of voucher as the
terms of the deposit or the usages of the
institution may provide for. The mere
possession of the book by tie bank would
afford no evidence of the payment of the
money to the depositor." The delivery of
such a book with the orally expressed
intent to give the money on deposit, he
concluded, did not make a gift. A written
assignment was necessary. Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177. Cf., remarks on this
case, in Hunsworth's Appeal, 180 Pa.
87,92.
The Weston book was of a different class.
The deposit could be drawn out only on
the presentation of the book. Its return,
with a demand for payment, as much entitled the holder of it to payment, as the
presentation of a certificate of deposit, of
a bond, of a policy of insurance or of a note,
or check, and the possession of the book
was as good a voucher for the bank as the
possession of these other instruments
would be for the debtor. If then, A's delivery of a bond to X, with the orally expressed intention to make it X's, would
give him the right to the money, without
writing, we see no reason for affirming
that a similar delivery of the deposit book,
with a similar intention, orally expressed,
would not give to X the right to get the
money. In Walsh's Appeal, the stipulation between the bank and the depositor
was, that no " transfer or assignment of
the book or of the money belonging to the
depositor, can be acknp wledged." Money
might be paid on check, or on a power of
attorney. The possession of the book does
not seem to have entitled one to obtain

payment. The book issued to Weston was
itself a voucher and presentation of it warranted and obliged the bank to pay the
deposit. Cf., Pierce- v. Boston Savings
Bank, 129 Mass. 425; Polley v. Hicks, 58
Ohio 218; Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364;
Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; Tillinghast
v. Wheaton, 8 R. 1.586; Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602.
The book and the deposit of $1000 became, then, the property of Jacob Weldman. Burns has surreptitiously obtained
the book, and bymeans of it, procured the
money from the bank. It does not belong
to him either individually or representatively, but it belongs to Weidman. It is
our duty, therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, to say that if you find the facts to be
such as the evidence for the plaintiff represents them, your verdict should be for
him, for $1000 with interest from the time
of the payment of that sum to Burns by
the bank.
WILLIAM HASKELL vs. AMOS
GOULD.
Mortgaqe-Sale-Subrogation.
Action in Assumpsit.
WALTER B. FREED and UHAS. G. MoYER for plaintiff.
Gould, the defendant, bought the land
subject to the mortgage. Haskell, by a
suit brought upon his land was compelled
to pay the mortgage and is therefore subrogated to rights of mortgagee.
Plaintiff brinas this action to recover the
mortgage and -interest. Miller's Ai)peal,
184 Pa. 414; Blank v. German, 5 W. & S.
36; Burke v. Gunimey, 49 Pa. 518; Taylor
v. Preston, 79 Pa. 436; Moore's Appeal, 88
Pa. 450.
Gxo. W. COLEs appearing for defendant.

The plaintiff is not subrogated to rights
of mortgagee, because no assignment has
been made and the mortgage has been
marked satisfied.
If plaintiff is subrogated, his rights are
those of mortgagee. Therefore the defendant submits, that, as the mortgagee could
not maintain an action in assumpsit
against this defendant, the plaintiffcannot
do so.
Judgment obtained in such an action
would be ajudgment "inp rsonam," while
a judgment on a mortgage is a judgment
"in rem)1.1
That to permit this action, would be to
subject not only the property on which
mortgage lies, but any other property the
defendant might have.
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genuine contract, it cannot be imposed
upon the defendant in this action, for there
is no contractual relation whatever between him and the plaintiff. But if a
quasi-contractualfoundation is sufficient
to support the rule, we see no reason why
it should not be applied to 'cases of this
kind as well as to those in which the purchaser acquired the mortgaged lands by
the voluntary conveyance of the mortgagor. The opinion of Lord Eldon is not
as clear upon this point as might be desired. The words-"He must be supposed
to intend to indemnify the vendor against
the mortgage," seem to imply the idea of a
genuine contract, but in view of the learned judge's expressed declaration that the
OPINION OF THE COURT.
obligation is "independent of contract,"
If the house and lot had been conveyed we are of the opinion that they are not to
to the defendant by the deed of the plaintiff be given that significance. Certainly equity
instead of by a sheriff's deed, the plaintiff is justified in raising a quasi-contractual
obligation. When a man purchases land
would clearly be entitled to judgment in
this action, for it is said to be well settled upon which there is a mortgage lien, he
that a mortgagor, who after selling his land pays for it, presumably, such a sum as in
subject to the lien of the mortgage, is com- his judgment represents the value of the
pelled to pay by suit on his bond, may be property over and above the mortgage
subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. lien. In other words, the real considerStanhope's Estate, 184 Pa. 414; Girard Life ation is the amount paid by him, plus the
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 86 Pa. 89; amount of the mortgage which he intends
Trevor v. Perkins, 5 Wharton 252; Am. & to carry or to pay. Of course, the vendor
Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 15, p. S35, and is still personally bound to the mortgagee
cases there cited. The reason for the ex- by his bond, but the vendee, who has paid
istence of the rule is set forth by Lord El- for the property only the difference bedon in Waring v. Ward, 7 Vesey 337. "The tweeu the amount of the mortgage and
the value of the property, is clearly to be
purchaser of an equity of redemption
means at the time of the contract to buy regarded as the person primarily liable
for the debt. And if, in case the vendor
the estate subject to the mortgage. * * * *
If he enters into no obligation with the is compelled to pay the mortgage, the
vendee is permitted to retain the property
party from whom he purchases, neither by
bond nor contract of indemnity to save free and clear of encumbrance, a great inharmless from the mortgage, yet this justice is done, for the vendor is, in effect,
court, if he receives possession and has the compelled to pay the mortgage twice, and
profits, would independent of contract, the vendee gets the property for very much
raise upon his conscience an obligation to less than its real value. It makes not the
pay money due upon the vendor's trans- slightest difference whether the property
action of mortgage; for becoming owner of is purchased directly from the vendor, or
the estate he must be supposed to intend at a sheriff's sale-the effect is precisely
to indemnify the vendor against the mort- the same. And if equity will in the one
case, raise upon the conscience of the vengage."
Is the obligation imposed upon the pur- dor an obligation to indemnify the mortchaser by this rule contractual or quasi- gagor, there appears to be no sound reason
contractualin its nature? Is the purchaser why it should refuse to do so in the other.
This view finds support in Trickett on
held responsible because of an implied
agreement on his part to indemnify the Liens, in which it is said (. 812) that the
mortgagor, or because equity feigns such vendee may assume the duty of paying
the mortgage either by agreement or by
an agreement? If the liability rests upon
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Haskell made a mortgage on his house
and lot in Carlisle for $3800. A judgment
was subsequently recovered against him
by one Freed for $240 on which the premises were sold to Gould for $320, the mortgage not being divested. One year later
than this sale, the mortgagee threatened
to sue Haskell on the bond accompanying
the'mortgage, whereupon Haskell paid it.
The mortgagee refused to assign the bond
and mortgage but marked the latter "satisfied" on the record. Thi5 assumpsit is
brought to compel Gould t6 pay to Haskell
the money, $4100, paid by the latter on the
mortgage debt.
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the fact that he purchases the land at a
sheriff's sale. And Chancellor Kent in
Tice v. Annim, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 12.5,
says: "If a judgment creditor sells the
equity of redemption, * * and the mortgagee in such a case should endeavor to
collect his money out of the property of
the mortgagor, this court must either stay
such a proceeding, or compel him, upon
payment, to assign over his debt and security, to his debtor, so as to enable the
debtor to indemnify himself out of the
mortgaged premises.'" See also Russell v.
Allen, 10 Paige's Ch. (N. Y.) 249.
It was suggested upon the argument
that the proper remedy of the plaintiff in
this case is that indicated by Chancellor
Kent in the opinion just quoted,-a suit
in equity to compel the mortgagee to assign the mortgage to him in order that he
may forclose it against the defendant.
Upon reflection, we are satisfied that such
a remedy might prove entirely inadequate.
The vendee who purchases subject to a
mortgage, assumes the risk that the land
is of sufficient value to satisfy it. If he is
mistaken, or if from any cause the land
subsequently decreases in value to such an
extent that it is insufficient, he should
suffer the loss, and not the former owner.
Were the rule otherwise, the vendee might
by his own neglect cause a fall in value
without loss to himself, or indeed might intentionally reduce the value of the land
by converting a part of it or its product
into personalty or cash. Such, for instance, would be the case, if he were to cut
timber from the land, or quarry stone
upon it.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff
has recourse not merely to the mortgaged
premises, but to the defendant personally.
And since the obligation of the defendant
is quasi-contractualasstmpsit is the proper
remedy.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
HARMAN vs. TRITT.
Assessment of Cost in Tial.
Petition for rule to show cause.
YFAGER and GEARY for plaintiff.
1. If jury find for plaintiff heis entitled
to full costs. Gill v. Gill, .37 Pa. 312.
2. Judgment on conditional verdict in

ejectment carries costs. Bradley v. O'Donnell, 40 Pa. 479.
3. If person paying costs has cause to
complain of any of the items it was his
duty to have them taxed by proceedings
in court below. McGibbeny v. Jefferson
Gas Co., 139 Pa. 193.
ROTHERMEL and COLLINS for defendant.
1. Witness is to be paid by the party at
whose instance or on whose behalf he
attends court and he can look to nc other.
Loan Asso. v. P. & R. R. R. 102 Pa. 223;
Prescott v..Otterstaller, 8.5 Pa. 534.
2. Harman should bring claim against
plaintiff in action of assumpsit. Guest v.
Philadelphia Co., 77 Pa. Super. 321.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

An action of ejectment was brought by
David Stanton against INoail Tritt. On
the trial of the case a verdict was recovered
for the plaintiff, and a judgment for the
verdict and costs were entered. Frank
Harman the plaintiff in this ease w~s a
witness for the plaintiff in the ejectment
case. The defendant paid the verdict and
all of the costs except those of the plaintiff
Harnian, which he claimed were excessive. Harman now asks the court for a
rule to show cause why Tritt should not
pay over the sum of$100, which was taxed
as the amount of Harman's costs.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In Stanton's ejectment against Noah
Tritt, a verdict and judgment were recovered by the former. The costs were
taxed by Stanton, and among them was
$100 fees of Frank Harman, one of Stanton's witnesses. Had there been any objection to these fees, an appeal could have
been taken by Tritt from the prothonotary's taxation, to the Court of Common
Pleas. None has been taken. Of., Wadlinger, Costs 60, et seq. Tritt however demurs to the payment of $100 to Harman.
Costs, payable to the prothonotary, the
sheriff, or other officers, are recovered by
the successful party, not for his own use,
but in trust for them. A payment of them
by the losing to the successful party, does
not discharge the former, but he may b3
compelled to pay them again to the officers. Ellsbre v. Ellsbre, 28 Pa. 172;
Ranck v. Hill, 3 Pa. 423. The officers may
issue an execution in the name of the suecessful party, although he has-received the
costs from the defendant, 28 Pa. 172; 3 Pa
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423; Howard v. Phila. etc., R. R. Co., 102
Pa. 220; Altman v. Klingensmith, 6 W.
445; Wadlinger, Costs, 113.
Witnesses' costs, however, stand ol a
different footing. They do not belong to
the witnesses, but to the successful party.
If he receives them, he discharges the defendant. Griest v. Philada. Co., 7 Superior,
321. His creditor may attach the costs and
so deprive the witnesses of their right to
them. Howard v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co.,
102 Pa. 220, or he may set them off against
a debt due by himself. Howell v. Withers,
I Dist. R. 62. The costs are an indemnity
te the succeeding party, and are his.
Leonard v. Smith, 4 Dist. R. 249; Hartley
v. Hoppee, 3 Dist. 770; Prescott v. Otterstatter, 85 Pa. 534. The witnesses whom he
calls to court, have an action against him,
on the implied or express assumpsit.
They have no such claim against the
party who did not subpena theri. Harmain was subponaed by Stanton, and his
testimony was for the benefit of Stanton.
To Stanton he must look for his conipensation. Hle might have insisted on being
paid by Stanton even before the verdict
had been rendered, for his right is not contingent on the issue of the suit. No law
makes the party against whom he testified
liable to compensate him for the damnatory evidence. Cf., Utt v. Long, 6 W. &
S. 174; Wadlinger, Costs, 346; Howard v.
Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 102 Pa. 220.
Had the judgment made Tritt liable to
Harman, Harman's remedy would have
been like that of the officer's, an execution
upon it in the name of the plaintiffi A
rule on Tritt to show cause why he should
not pay the costs taxed against him, would
be incongruous. The judgment and taxation, would have already ascertained
that he was bound to pay them. In
Guest v. Phila. Co., 7 Superior, 321, a
rule was issued again-t the defendant at
the instance of the witness. The excuse
for this procedure was that on paying onefifth of the fee of the witness to the plaintiff, he had marked the judgment paid; so
that it would have been anomalous to issue afl.fa. The Superior court, reversing
the court below, discharged the rule. Had
there been no satisfaction of thejudgment,
the witness could not have sustained the
rule. What standing had he? "He was
not," as Beaver, J., remarks, "the defend-

ant's witness. There was no contract on
the part of the defendant, express or implied, to pay him his witness fees. His
claim was against the plaintiff who had
subpoenaed him and was doubtless liable
to pay him whatever witness fees might
be due him, which might have been received in an action of assumpsit."
Harman's only remedy is an action of
assumpsit against Stanton. The rule to
show cause must therefore be discharged.

IN RE WILLIAMS ESTATE.
What constitutes a nuncupation will-A
Donatio Causamortis-A Donatiointer
vivos-Intention to make a gift and testimonial distinguished.
For thc exception W. W. JOHNSTON and
R. F. ALEXANDER.
To .constitute a perfect gift the donor
must part with the possession and doininion. Schict v. Grote, 5 cut (N. Y.) 826;
Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. 345. -The giving of
the bond was of a testahentary character.
Against the exception S. E. BASHORE
and A. N. WALLACE.
1. A valid gift of non-negotiablesecurities may be made by delivery of them to
the donee without assignment or endorsement in writing. Wells v. Tucker, 3
Binn. 366; Licey v. Licey, 7 Pa. 251;
Bunting v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co.,
81 Pa. 254.
2. From the character of the thing, and
the conditions and circumstances at the
time, and subsequent to the transaction,
show that the intention of the party was
to make a gift. Nichols v. Adams, 2 Wha.
17; Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 187; Commonwealth v. Crompton; 137 Pa. 138; Mack
and Person's App., 68 Pa. 231.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In May 1895, John Williams was the
owner of a $1000 bond of the Carlisle Street
Railway Company. He had a son, George,
and several children and a wife besides.
At the time mentioned the decedent was
sick yet not seriously so. He gave the
bond in question to his son George telling
him that it was for him when he died.
Williams died in 1898, and George was
appointed administrator. His account was
filed, and he failed to charge himself with
the $1000. The other heirs have filed exceptions to the account, and it has been
sent to the auditor to pass upon.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The exception to the administrator's
account complains that he has not charged
himself therein with the $1000 bond of the
railway company. If that bond was the
property of Williams, when he died, it
should have been embraced within the
account. If prior to his death Williams
had given it to his son George, at a time
when he was insolvent it would have been
the duty of the administrator to recover it
for the benefit of the creditors. 8 Am. and
Eng. Encyc. 1352. It is not alleged that
Williams was insolvent when lie made the
gift or when he died.
The bond is alleged to have been given
to the son, George. If it was thus given,
it was not a portion of John Williams' estate. The administrator-insolvency not
leing alleged-had no right to it. Prior v.
Morgan, 170 Pa. .568, and therefore need
not charge himself with it.
We may dismiss the hypothesis that
George is a nuncupative legatee of his
father. Parol wills of chattels are allowed,
under the condition that (1) they are made
during the last sickness of the testator, (2)
in a habitation in which he has resided ten
days before the nuncupation and (3) that
the testator called on persons present to
bear witness to the will. The will must
also be probated. 1 P. & L. 1443, 1444,
1456, 1457. It does not appear that any of
these conditions have been observed. If
George Williams has a right to the bond,
it is not founded on a nuncupative bequest.
Was the bond given mort s causa? Such
a gift is made in expectation of death from
some sickness or other peril. It is intended
to be revocable by the donor. It is ipso
facto revoked, if he escapes from the danger of death in which he was, when he
made it, by getting better, if sick, or by
the removal of the external risk. If there
was a gift at all, it is clear that it was not
of the conditionai sort, designated as a
donatio morts causa. The donor was sick
but not seriously so. He is not shown to
have apprehended death. It does not appear that the sickness continued for the
period of nearly three years, between the
alleged gift and the death.
(7f., Candor's
Appeal, 27 Pa. 119.
Was there then the gift which is known
as inter vivos. A gift of a bond can be

made by a mere delivery without an accompanying assignment or endorsement.
Qf. Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. 345;
Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 370; Commonwealth v. Crompton, 137 Pa. 138. Besides
the delivery, nothing more is necessary
than the animus donandi. If the owner
hands the bond to X, with the intention
that eo instante it shall become X's, he
gives it. If his intention is that it shall,
at some future time, become X's, he does
not give it. He simply intends to give it.
The railway bond was delivered to George
Williams. But with what intention? The
decedent told him "that it was for him
when he died." It is clear, we think, that
the bond was intended to become George's
only at the death of John. Meantime,
then, it remained George's The gift was
testamentary in character, and as it was
not expressed in writing, nor in the prescribed forms of nuncupation. it was invalid. Stockham's Estate, 6 Dist. Rep. 196.
The auditor was therefore correct, in surcharging the administrator with the value
of the bond.

SIMONS vs.

SANDERSON
WIFE.

AND

Insolvent debtor-foney exipended on
wife's property-Creditors entitled to increase of value.
Bill in equity.
CHARLES H. MEYER and
FLANIGAN for the plaintiff.

Wir.

M.

i. William Sanderson was insolvent at
the time of making said improvements as
a matter of fact. Am. & Eng. Encyc. 11
Vol. 168.
2. Sanderson either intended to defraud creditors with his wife's assistance,
or they together agreed to allow a lien to
run against the wife's property. Barto's
Appeal, 55 Pa. 386; Bodey v.*Thackara,
143 Pa. 171; Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa. 451.
S. B. HARE and EUGENE D. SIEGRIST
for the defendant.
1. If husband improves his wife's land
without any agreement, he gains no right
or title thereto which his creditors can
reach by attachment or by aid of a court
of Equity. Webster v. Hildreth, 33 Vt.
457.
2. Property of wife not liable to sale to
satisfy judgment creditors of the husband.
Robinson v. Huffman, 54 Ky. 80; Barto's
Appeal, 55 Pa. 386.

THE FORUM.
3. Fraud must be proven and cannot
be presumed. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 118 Pa.
338; Mead v. Conroe,.113 Pa. 220.
4. Insolvency makes no difference if
fraud is not alleged. Angier v. Agnew,
98 Pa. 587.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mary Sanderson obtained from her
father, by devise, a lot of land in Carlisle.
Four years afterwards, her husband spent
S4000 in improving it by the erection of a
house upon it. He was, at this time
heavily indebted to seven persons, his debts
to Simons being $6000. His other debt
amounted to $10,000. He was in the dry
goods business, his stock being worth not
more than $9000. Several of his creditors obtainingjudgment, sold out by means of the
sheriff his business, and the proceeds, $7500,
were applied to the debts. Simons, not having issued an execution, did not share in
them. Sanderson having no other property, Simons filed this bill to have the
court to decree that Sanderson had a lien
upon, or equitable interest in his wife's
lands to the amount of S6000, in order that
Simons might sell the interest, or be subrogated to the lien.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant William Sanderson was
clearly insolvent when he expended four
thousand dollars in improving his wife's
property. So far as appears by the facts
before us, his assets were not more than
nine thousand dollars, while his liabilities amounted to sixteen thousand dollars. And his inability to pay his debts
as they fell due is shown by the fact that
his business was sold out by the sheriff underjudgment obtained against him.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
it is but reasonable to assume that Mary
Sanderson was not ignorant of the erection
of the house upon her land, and that she
gave her assent thereto. It does not appear, however, that she was aware at that
time of the financial condition of her husband.
Under these circumstances, should
equity charge the property of Mary Sanderson with the payment of her husband's
debt to plaintiff, to the extent of the cost
of the improvements made upon it? It has
been decided that if the improvements are
made by the husband against the will of
the wife and in spite of her protests, equity

will not encumber the wife's property.
Barto's Appeal, 55 Pa. 336. On the other
hand it would seem equally clear that if
the wife is guilty of collusion with her
husband, equity will protect the creditors.
Dictum of Judge Pearson, in Barto's Appeal, (supra); People's Natl. Bank v.
Loeffert, 184 Pa. 164. But what, if there
is neither, on the one hand, protest by the
wife, nor on the other hand, collusion?
The precise case is apparently a novel one
in this jurisdiction, but we may resort for
enlightenment to tile reports of other
states.
.In the Vermont case of Webster v. Hildreth, 33 Vermont 456, it was alleged in
the bill that the husband had invested his
money and property in his wife's farm
with the intent to defraud his creditors,
but the evidence merely showed that the
husband, with his wife and four minor
sons, had lived on the farm and cleared
and improved it in order togetalivingand
promote the comfort and welfare of the
family. The court held, and we believe
rightly, that by so doing the husband acquired no interest in the property that
could be reached by his creditors. To
have held otherwise would have been to
declare, as the court pointed out, that men
may be compelled to work for their creditors, "who perversely prefer to work for
the benefit of their wives and children,
and leave honest debtors unpaid."
The Kentucky case of Robinson v.
Huffman, 15 B. Monroe 80, bears a somewhat closer analogy to the one before us.
There, the husband, who was a country
physician of small practice, expended some
four hundred dollars in necessary repairs
upon a log house which belonged to his
wife and was the home of the family, and
the plaintiff, who had a judgment against
him for about one hundred dollars, asked
for a sale of the house under an execution
upon hisjudgment. The court denied his
prayer, saying: "He seems to have done
little more in putting this house and lot in
tenantable condition than was necessary
to perform his obligation to support his
wife and family."
It must be admitted that the circumstances of that case are exceptional, and
very much more favorable to the wife than
those of tile case before us. There the sum.
expended was $400; here it is $4000. There
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it was expended in repairs that were absolutely necessary to put a house in habit-

able and decent condition ; here it is expended An erecting what must be at least
a very substantial residence. There the
house upon which the money was expended was the family home; here that
fact does not appear. Indeed, had the
facts of the present case been before the
Kentucky court, we seriously doubt if its
decision would have been the same.
We believe that a more satisfactory precedent for our decision is found in the
Massachusetts case of Lynde v. McGregor,
13 Allen 182. In that case the wife did not
know of the financial condition of her
husband. She executed a mortgage upon
her land, as security for $2000 advanced to
him, and he, with the knowledge of the
mortgagee, expended the $2000, and other
sums in addition thereto, in improving
and building upon the land. The opinion
of the court was written by Judge Gray
in the clear-and concise style for which he
is justly distinguished, and we cannot do
better than to quote with approval, his own
language: "Under these circumstances,
if no greater sum of money was expended
by the husband after the execution of the
mortgage than $2000, the sum which had
been raised and charged upon the land; or
if more than $2000 was so expended by the
husband, but the excess above that sum
did not increase the value of the land
above what it would have been without it;
his creditors or assignees in insolvency
have no equity against the wife, who has
participated in no fraud against such
creditors, and whose estate has received
no benefit from the transactions of the
husband. But if more than $2000 has been
expended upon the land since the making
of the mortgage, and the excess over $2000
has increased the value of the estate, then
the amount of such increase in value, for
which no consideration has been paid by
the wife, and which has been added to her
estate by her husband in fraud of his
creditors, in equity belongs to them, and
may be made a charge upon the land for
their benefit."
It seems to us that such a decree is perfectly equitable to all parties. The crediiors are enabled to effectually balk the
fraudulent scheme of the deblor to placehis property beyond their reach, and at the

same time, the innocent wife suffers no
financial loss whatever, aside from the loss
of that which her husband has given to
her in fraud of his creditors. Moreover,
we believe it answers a demand of public
policy, in, providing a strong safeguard
against the danger of that collusion between husband and wife which it is so
often impossible to establish by proof. It
is true, perhaps, that in some cases the enforcement of the lien by a sale might deprive an innocent woman of her chosen
home. But is a husband to be permitted
to make use of the attachment of his wife
for their chosen place of residence as a
shield against the just demands of his
creditors? However, the court is willing
to do all in its power to prevent even such
a loss. With that end in view, it will be
provided in the decree that proceedings for
the sale of the property shall not be taken
within one month from the entry of the
decree, so that the wife, Mary Sanderson,
may have every opportunity to raise a
sufficient sum of money to pay the lien of
the plaintiff, by executing a mortgage
upon her propertv, or otherwise, and thus
save her residence from passing into other
hands.
When the extent to which the property
of the defendant Mary Sanderson was increased in value by the improvements
made upon it by her husband, shall be
properly ascertained, a decree will be
entered in accordance with the foregoing
opinion.
TRUSTEES vs. BROWN.
Voluntary deed of trmst-?evocation o.f.
Bill in Equity.
ROBERT

P. STEWART and C. A.

SHAMI-

for the trustees.
1. This was a tru.t deed and not a testamentary instrument. According to the
general rule if it contained no clause of revocation it was irrevocable. Wilson v.
Armstrong, 186 Pa. 540; Neal v. Black,
177 Pa. 98; Edwards v. Edwards, 170 Pa.
212; Fellow's Appeal, 93 Pa. 471; Solens
v. Phila. Trust Co., 16 W. N. C., 81;
Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. 489.
2. Brown's written revocation is of no
value. The court above has power to revoke. Act of June 14, 183q. P. L. 628;
Seibert's Appeal, 19 Pa. 49; Neal v. Black,
177 Pa. 83.
BAUGH
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Miss J. ANNA

RADLE

and D.

EDWARD

LONG for Brown.

1. The voluntary deed of trust was a
revocable instrument because of the special circumstances. Chestnut St. Nat. Bk.
v. F. Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 333; Sturgeon v.
Stevens, 186 Pa. 365; Frederick's Appeal,
52 Pa. 338; Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528;
Russell's Appeal, 75 Pa. 269; Miskey's Appeal, 107 Pa. 628.
2. Not only would a court of Equity
grant relief, but the grantor can, without
such aid, by his own act revoke the deed.
Frederick's Appeal, 52 Pa. .338; Chestnut
St. Nat. Bk., etc., supra; Sturgeon v. Stevens, supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In 1868, John Brown conveyed by deed
of trust to C. P. H. and J. L. S. all his real
estate, and in which deed of trust is contained the following provision; "The parties of the second part shall collect all the
share of the rents and income of, said properties and after the payment of taxes and
other necessary expenses shall pay over the
income into the hands of the said John
Brown for and during the term of his
natural life, and after his death should he
die without leaving issue then to pay over
such net income to any wife that lie may
leave him surviving during all the term of
her natural life, and after the death of the
said John Brown leaving issue or in the
event of his death without leaving issue.
but leaving a wife him surviving, then
after the death of such wife, or should he
die without leaving issue or a wife him
surviving, then after his death the said
parties of the second part shall and will
convey, assign, transfer and set-over the
said premises hereby described and conveyed, or any other property or securities
that may be substituted therefor in such
proportions and for such estate or estates
to such person or persons as would be entitled to the same under the Intestate Laws
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
had the said John Brown died intestate
seized in fee or possessed absolutely of such
property."
John Brown since the execution of this
deed has been married and has several
minor children.
He, recently, (January 1st, 1899,) wrote
a revocation of the deed aforesaid and
placed it on record in the Courts of Centre
county without consulting the Trustees,
C. P. H. and J. L. S.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

In view of the large number of cases in
which the revocability of instruments
similar to the one before us has been considered by the courts of this State, the degree of uncertainty and confusion that
still exists, is astonishing. Many of the
authorities were discussed at length by the
learned counsel upon the argument, and
nearly all of them appear upon the brief
submitted to the court. An extended review of them would add little to the value
of this opinion. Suffice it to say that
after careful consideration, we are satisfied
that the case before us lies within the limits of the doctrine first enunciated in
Frederick's Appeal, 52 Pa. 338. In that
case the settler executed a deed of trust by
which the income of the property conveyed
was to be paid to himself during life, and
the principal was to be divided among his
nine children after his death. By another
deed subsequently executed he revoked
the first deed of trust and made a will
leaving all his property to two of the nine
children. The court supported the revocation of the first deed, Woodward, C. J.,
saying: "We are of opinion that the deed
in question here was made for the grantor's
own personal convenience, that the trustees were to account to him for all they
did under the powers vested in them, and
that no beneficial interest was to vest in
his children until after his death. A disposition of property to take effect after the
grantor's death is testamentary and therefore revocable."
This doctrine has been frequently enforced, notably in Russell's Appeal, 75 Pa.
279, and Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528. In
Russell's Appeal, it was declared that "in
the absence of a certain intent to make the
gift irrevocable, the omission of a power
to revoke is prima facie evidence of a mistake, and in Rick's Appeal, Mr. Justice
Paxson said: "There may be instances in
which it is to be the highest interest of a
man to place his estate beyond his control
irrevocably. He may do so to protect
himself against his own infirmities. But
the exercise of such a power should be
closely guarded." Perhaps the most recent instances of the application of the
doctrine, are found in the two cases of
Sturgeon v. Stevens, 186 Pa. 350, and
Chestnut St. Nat. Bank v. Fidelity In-
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surance, etc., Co., 186 Pa. 333. In this lattrust will be enforced in favor of the beneter case, the court, after setting forth
ficiaries, even though their enjoyment of
the principle upon which the doctrine
the estate is postponed until the death of
rests, significantly said: "In the present
their benefactor. Equity, because of exceptional facts in rare cases, has revoked
case these considerations appear to be directly applicable. During the life of Mrs.
thetrust, or held it revocable by the grantBryant, the settler, the entire income of the
or, because plainly a testamentary instrutrust was to be paid to her, and the deed
ment; but the general rule has remained
must be deemed to have been made for her
without change." In this case, however,
own personal convenience and advantage. as in all cases where the deed is held tO be
irrevocable, there is evidence showing beNo other interests arose during her life,
and none were to accrue until after her
yond question that the settler, by reason of
improvidence, intemperance or other indeath."
firmity, intended to place his property
It must be conceded that in each of the
cases above cited, the court was guided to
entirely and irevocably beyond his control.
its conclusion that the deed was revocable,
In the case at bar, on the other hand, there
appears to have been no conceivable moby some circumstance that is not present
in the caseatbar. In Frederick's Appeal,
tive for making the settlement irrevocable,
it appeared on the face of the instrument
and we are convinced that equitable printhat it was made solely for the conve- ciples demand that we regard it as having
nience of the settler. In Russell's Appeal
been -mademerely for the personal convenience of the settler and without any inand Rick's Appeal, it was shown that the
tention of creating an irrevocable trust.
revocation clause was omitted by mistake
The bill is therefore dismissed.
or misunderstanding and that the settlement was intended to be revocable. In
Sturgeon v. Stevens, the death of the son
TAYLOR MORRISON vs. HARRISON
during the lifetime of the mother frustratWEAKLEY.
ed the sole purpose of the settlement and
Bight
to
growing
crop-passes with realty
left the settler the sole beneficiary of the
-Is subject to sci. fa. sur. mortgage.
trust. In Chestnut St. Bank v. Fidelity
Ins., &c., Co.,itseems to have appeared afHEARPEL and ME&RKLE for plaintiff.
firmatively that the settler'sattention was
1. Grain growing in ground is a chatnot called to the fact of the omission of a
tel and as such is subject to be taken on
revocation clause nor to the advisability of
execution. Whipple v. Foot, 2 Johnston
422;, Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johnston
its insertion. Nevertheless, we believe
112; Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cowen 41; 1
that the judicial declarations quoted from
368.
these cases clearly indicate that the ten- Lack.
2. An unripe growing crop is personal
dency of the courts is to favor the revocaproperty not capable of manual delivery,
and an attachment may be levied on it as
bility of voluntary settlements. And in
such. Raventas v. Green, 57 Cal. 254;
view of this tendency, we are of the opinion
v. Seavers, 103 Pa. 519; Hershey v.
that since, in the case at bar the entire ill- Long
Metzger, 90 Pa. 218;fStambaugh v. Yeates, 2
come was to be paid to the settler during
Rnwle (Pa.) 161; 29 Pa. 66; Johnston v.
his life, and no other interests could arise Smith, 3 Penrose & Watts, (Pa.) 496.
3. When aft. fa. is issued on a judguntil after his death, it is reasonable to asment and appraisement, is held to*be a
sume that the settlement was made solely
severance of crops. Hershey v. Metzger,
for the settler's own personal convenience
90 Pa. 217; Stambaugh v. Geates, 2 Rawle
(Pa.) 171; Myers v. White, 1 Rawle (Pa.)
and advantage, and that he did not intend
to place the disposition of his property be- 353.
RUSsELL and HEss for defendant.
yond his control.
1. The growing crop is realty until
The only case which causes us any hesisevered and a sale upon execution of a
tation in reaching the conclusion stated, ft. fa. does not constitute such severance.
is the very recent one of Wilson v. AnderLong v. Seavers, 103 Pa. 522; Hershey v.
Metzger, 9 Norris 217.
son, 186 Pa. 531, in which Dean, J., says:
2. It could not be ascertained whether
"The general rdle is that if the intention
the way-growing crop is the property of
of the grantor at the time he delivered the
Epply or Todd until April 1, 1897, theredeed was to part with the legal title, the
fore tie levy and sale was illegal and Mfor-
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nity, the way going crop, as personalty, belongs to the landlord. We cannot see that
the case is thereby materially affected.
The custom simply imposes upon an outgoing tenant the duty of leaving a growing
crop where he found one at the beginning
of his term. Until the close of the term,
then, the grain clearly belongs to the tenant
in possession. ft is his personal property,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
and as such is of course subject to seizure
On April 1st, 1896.William Eppley was
and sale under an execution issued upon a
the owner of a farm situated in Cumber- judgment against him. But the landlord
land County. This he rented to Lemuel
has not the slightest interest in the grain,
Todd until April 1st, 18P7. By the custom
considered as personalty. He has no right
of the community the way going crop beto enter upon the land to take the crop,
longs to the landlord. Taylor Morrison
and his creditors have no right to levy an
issued a ft. fa. on a judgment against
execution against it. Loose v. Scharff, 6
Eppley in December 1896, and the Sheriff Sup. Ct. 153.
levied on the way going crop, which was
The levy under which the grain was
purchased by Morrison, the plaintiff. In
purchased by the plaintiff was illegal and
February of 1897, Weakley issued a sc-i.
void, and did not operate as a con.structive
fa., on a mortgage held against this land
severance of the grain from the soil. It
of Eppley's and a levarifacias was issued
was therefore stilla part of the realty when
and the land sold by the Sheriff, and posthe land was sold to defendant undera sei.
session taken by.Weakley. Morrison now
fa. sur mortgage.
claims the way going crops, which the de.Judgment for defendant.
fendant denies. This action of assumpsit
is brought to recover their value by MorANTHONY ECKERT vs. CARLISLE
rison.
TRACTION CO
OPINION OF THE COURT.
rison acquired no title by purchasing at
the sale.
2. The purchaser of mortgaged premises
under a foreclosure sale is entitled to the
crops sown by the mortgagor, and growing on the land at the time of the sale.
Shepherd v. Philbrick, 2 Denio 174; Simers v. Saltus, 3 Denio 214; Sallade v.
James, 6 Barr 144; Sherman v. Willet, 42
N. Y. 146; Hamblett v. Bliss, 55 Vt. 535,

Growing grain is personalty in that it
may be seized and sold in satisfaction of an
execution. 'Stambaugh v. Geates, 2 Rawle
161; Hershey v. iMfetzgar, 90 Pa. 217. It
is also a part of the realty in that it passes
with a sale of the land. Wilkins v. Vashbinder, 7 Watts. 378; Backentoss v. Stahler's Adm., 33 Pa. 251. Consequently, if
a man sow grain upon his own land, he is
the ownerof it whether it be considered
as realty or personalty. His creditors may
levy upon it as personalty, and such a
levy undoubtedly effects such a legal severance from the soil as to pass title in the grain
to the purchaser. If, however, the grain is
sownbya tenantin possession of the l.nd it
belongs to him as personalty, and the landlord owns only as part of the land. It
follows that the grain may be levied upon,
only under an execution upon a judgment
against the tenant. Long v. Seavers, 103
Pa. 517.
The foregoing propositions are not in
dispute in the case before the court. But
it is asserted that they have no application
here, since by the custom of the commu-

Effect of judgment in Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania on suit brought in District
Court of the United States.
HENDERSON and BROOKS for plaintiff.
Judgment of reversal constitutes no bar
to another suit for the same cause. Fries
v. Pa. Railroad Co, 98 Pa. 142; Mercer v.
Watson, 1 Watts. 330.
After suit is brought the jurisdiction of
the court cannot be taken away by subsequent events. United States v. Dawson,
15 How. 467; Raymond v. Butterworth,
139 Mass. 471.
SHAFFER and KATZ for defendant.
Judgment rendered in a cause is a bar
to a second suit for thesame cause between
the same parties. Buck v. Wilson, 113 Pa.
423; Sykes v. Gerber, 98 Pa. 180; Burlen v.
Shannon, 99 Mass. 203.
STATEDIENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff in this case brought an action in the court of common pleas of Cumberland County against the Carlisle Traction Company, and recovered a verdict for
$5000. This was appealed to the Supreme
Court of the State. While before that
court and before decision was rendered,
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the plaintiff brought an action 'for the
same cause against the Traction Company
in the district court of the United States
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Subsequently the State Supreme Court
reversed the finding of the lower court
and enteredjudgment for the defendant.
The defendant now claims in the circuit
court of the United States that the case is
rev judicataand must be dismissed.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is well settled that the recovery of a
judgment in one action is a bar to a recovery in another for the same cause, between the same parties, although the latter was begun before the rendition of the
judgment. Casebeer v. Mowry, 55 Pa.
419; Dully v. Lytle, 5 W. 120. A reversal,
however, by the supreme court, simply
extinguishes the judgment. It is not itself a judgment on the merits. Unaccompanied by a venire facias de novo, it
terminates the action, and not even costs
can be collected on it, by the party who
has procured the reversal; Smith v.
Sharp, 5 W. 292; but it does not pre6lude
a second action.
The 2d section of the act of March 27th,
1713, 1 P. & L. 2670, expressly authorizes a
second action within one year after a judgment of reversal. Cf., Wrasse v. Traction
Co., 146 Pa. 417, 427; as indeed do the
principles of the common law. Fries v.
Penna. R. R., 98 Pa. 142.
Prior to the act of May 20th, 1891, 1 P.
& L. 142, the supreme court when dissatisfied with the judgment of the court
below, simply reversed it with or without
a venire facias. That act athorizes the
court to reverse the judgment, "and to enter such judgment order or decree in the
case as the supreme court may deem
proper and just, without returning the
record for amendment or modification to
the court below." If the appellate court
at first reverses a judgment without a
venire facias, it may, on a later application by the defendant, enter a judgment in
his favor nunc pro tune, Nugent v.
Philada. Traction Co., 183 Pa. 142. When
the supreme court reversing it then or
later enters a judgmentfor the defendant,
this judgment becomes a bar to any subsequent recovery by the losing party; Nugent v. Phila. Traction Co., 7 D. R. 384.

Not only was Eckert's judgment for $5000
reversed, but the supreme court IIentered
judgment for the defendant." This judgment prevents any recovery in the present
action.
It is further objected to the recovery,
that the Circuit Court of the United States
has no jurisdiction. The Constitution of
the United States, Act 3, 0 2, defines the
judicial power of the United States. To
none of the classes there enumerated, does
this action belong. It does not arise under
the Federal constitution or laws; it does
not affect ambassadors: it is not of the admiralty or maritime class; the United
States is not a party to it, nor any state or
foreign nation. No land is claimed in it,
under grants of different states. Is the
controversy "between citizens of different
states." The act of Congress of March 3d,
1887, gives to the Circuit Courts jurisdiction over such controversies, when $2000
or more is involved. But the citizenship
of the parties must appear upon the record.
1 Garland, U. S. Courts, 168. The record
does not inform us of what state Eckert
and the Carlisle Traction Company are
citizens. It will not be assumed that they
are citizens of different states. It is altogether clear then, that there can be no recovery.
McCOY vs. BOROUGH OF HARRIS.
Liability of Boroughfor negligence of servants- What is negligence-Proximate
cause.
Action in Tort.
M CABE and CONLEY for plaintiff.
1. If legal rights are exercised in a negligent and unlawful way defendant is liable
in damages to person injured. Ritch v.
Souders, 2 Forum 35; Fox v. Borkey, 126
Pa. 169; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 441.
2. Proximate cause is when the injury
results from the act in such a manner that
it could have been directly foreseen and is
peculiarly applicable to accidents resulting from frights of a horse. Pittsburg
Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306.
COMREY and RYAN for defendant.
1. A Municipal Corporation is not responsible for negligent act of servants.Elliot v. City of Phila., 75 Pa. 347: Knight
v. City of Phila., 15 W. N. C. 307; Hand
v. City of Phila., 8 Pa. C. C. R. 213.
2. When a public school house is being
erected on its own land by the borough-
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it is not liable for injuries occasioned to a
traveler upon adjoining highway, thiough
the negligence of a servant blasting rock
for foundation. Howard v. Worcester,
153 Mass. 426.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant in this case was engaged
in the construction of a school house in the
Borough of Harris. An employee of the
the borough was engaged in blasting for
the cellar. The plaintiff was driving a
team on the street in front of the proposed
building. Notwithstanding that the employee saw the plaintiffapproaching in his
carriage he gave no notice of his intention
to put off a blast, which he negligently did
put off while the carriage was immediately
in front. By reason of this negligence the
team was frightened and the plaintiff
thrown out, whereby he suffered injury
to the extent of $5000. He brings this action to recover from the borough. Motion
for non-suit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The borough of Harris was engaged in
the erection of a school-house, itself superintending and controlling it. One of 4ts
employees wasguilty of negligence, which
resulted in hijury to William McCoy.
Were the employer of McCoy an individual, or a private corporation, his negligence would be imputed to his master. If
the borough of Harris is not to be responsible its exemption must be due to the
nature of a municipality, orto the character of the construction in which it was engaged.
That cities and boroughs are liable for
many forms of negligence of their officers,
is too well known to need verification by
reference to the reported cases. There are
scores of instances in this State, in which
they have been held liable for defects hi
highways and in bridges due to the negligence of their agents. On the other hand
the courts have refused to make a city responsible for the misfeasance of a police
officer. Elliott v. Philada. 75 Pa. 347; Cf.
Bo.yd v. Insurance Patrol of Philada., 113
Pa. 269.
It is difficult however, to realize the
principle upon which the distinction between the sets of cases is based. As
Mitchell, J., remarks, "Nor is thedistinction between the cases where municipal
corporations have been liable and where

they have not, entirely logical or obvious,"
Briegal v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451. In
Ford v. Kendall Borough School District,
121 Pa. 543, the negligence of the school
directors and a janitor, caused the ignition
of the clothes of a pupil in a school house.
The defendant was held exempt from
liability, (1) because public school education is a great public charity, the school
district being only the agents of the state;
(2) the moneys dispensed by the district
are public moneys; (3) the law requires
the application of all the funds of the district to education, and therefore allow
none to be applied to damages arising from
negligence. A little reflection would expose the weakness of these considerations.
Public school education is hardly a charity
towards those whose taxes pay for it. It
is a charity, if at all, only towards the
children of parents who do not thus pay.
But, the furnishing of bridges and highways to such citizens as do not contribute
to their maintenance might justas wellbe
called a charity. Yet boroughs are liable
for negligence with respect to their highways. The moneys spent on highways are
public moneys. The law as clearly requires the road taxes to be spent on roads,
as theschool taxes to be spent on schools.
Yet townships and boroughs are compelled
to find means to compensate for damages.
It is not to be wondered at, that Gordon,
C. J., was compelled to confess, "All we
can say is that for the one class of cases
[roads etc.] we have precedent on which
to rest, and in the other, we have no such
precedent but rather the contrary." He
concludes however, "we have but to say
that whilst the doctrine respondent
.%periordoes apply to townships, boroughs
and cities, so far as streets and roads are
concerned, it does not apply to school districts." 121 Pa. 543. In School District
of Erie v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600, the district
was held not liable for damage to a pupil
frowi negligence in the alteration of the
school house chiefly because the work was
done by a contractor. Cf. Sproat v. Directors of the Poor, 145 Pa. 598.
In Briegal v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451,
the action was for injury to the plaintiffs
property, caused by the defendant's negligence in constructing the plumbing and
drainage connected with the privy well of
a public school building. Mitchell, J.,
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points out that the case differs from Ford
v. School District in (1) being against a
city, and not a school district; and (2) in
being an action for a nuisance by the negligent use of property. McCoy's action is
against the Borough of Harris. We are
not able, however, to believe that there is
any such difference between an action
against a school district, and an action
against a borough for acts committed by it
as a school district, as would require us denyingthe validity of the former, to concede
the validity of the latter. If, education is
a state function and a charity, it is such
whether the political agency dispensing it
is called a district or a borough. The
school taxes are as sacredly appropriated
to education in one case as in the other.
Nor'are the general funds of the borough
made applicable to damages arising from
the operations of the borough as a school
-district. We conclude that Ford v. School
District requires us to hold that the plaintiff cannot recover.
Howard v. City of Worcester, 153 Mass.
426, is exactly similar to the case before us.
The court decided that as the building was
being erected on ground prepared solely for
the public use, and with the sole view of
the public benefit, and under the requirement or authority of general laws, in the
absence of statute, there can be no private
remedy for injury from the negligent or
defective performance of the public service.
it is manifest that this principle would
extirpate all liability from negligence in
the construction or maintenance of roads
and bridges. Cf. Eastman v. Meredith,
36 N. H. 284; Benton v. Boston City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13.
Judgment of non-suit.

JAMES HILL vs. SAMUEL HARRISON.
W. H. TAYLOR and N. M. FRANTZ for
the plaintiff.
1. The sheriff is the agent of the law
and cannot impose any- conditions unauthorized by writ or, statute. 22 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. '600; Randolph et. al., Appeal, 5 Pa. 242.
2. Non-payment of the highest bidder
necessitates a re-sale; the second highest
bidder cannot claim as purchaser. 2 Disney (Ohio), 213; contra Swartzell v. Martin, 16 Iowa 529.

Wm. H. KERw and CHAS. A. SHREVE
for the defendant.
1. When the buyer is by the terms of
contract bound by certain conditions upon
the performance of which title possess, he
is obliged to fulfill the conditions even
though he has acquired possession. Bullantyin v. Appleton, 82 Me. 570; Gen.
Digest of U. S., Vol. 5, 1825.
Sheriff may resell if the purchaser does
not comply with the terms of the sale.
Gen. Dig. of U. S., Vol. 5, 1339.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The property of James Hill was seized
by the sheriff and offered at the- regulaK
sherift's sales. One condition provided
that "the deed will be made and tendered
to the next highest bidder complying with
the terms" in ease the original buyer
failed to comply. At the sale James Hill
purchased the property offered, but failed
to comply with the terms of the sale.
The next highest bidder was Samuel Harrison who had offered $1,000 less, and
upon offer of this money to the sheriff, the
money was accepted and a deed made to
him. The deed was offered for confirmation to the court, but was objected to by
Hill, on the ground that the condition
was unlawful. He asks that the sale to
Harrison be set aside and the property
again offered to public competition.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

As is indicated by the briefs of counsel,
there is a marked paucity of authority
upoif the question presented by this case.
In Troubat & Haley, 4 practice (4th Ed.)
Vol. 1, page 1000, it is said that "he property is to be sold at the time and place appointed, by auction to the highest and
best bidder. Therefore, if the highest bidder is unable to pay, the sheriff may make
an offer to the next highest bidder." Such,
a practice may have the sanction of custom in some communities, but no attempt
is made to rest upon the authority of adjudged cases. On the other hand, three
cases are cited by the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law in support of
thg statement that "non-payment of the
highest bid necessitates a re-sale; the second highest cannot thereupon be accepted." Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol.
22, p 600, citing S'wartzell v. Martin, 16
Iowa 519; Thompson v. McMauanma, 2
Disney (Ohio) 213; Matthews v. Clifton,
13 Smedes & Marshall, (Miss.) 330.

THE FORUM.
The only Pennsylvania case in point
that has been discovered, is Kunkel v.
Eby, 7 Pa. Dist. 672, decided by the Common Pleas of Dauphin county in 1898. In
that case the sale was set aside. The question seems to have been considered by
Judge McPherson with great care, and
the arguments advanced by him are most
convincing. "If the sheriff," he says,
"can bind himself to make a deed to the
next. highest bidder complying with the
terms," it would not be hard for the two
persons acting in collusion to secure a
debtor's property at a price much below
its value. If one should offer such a price
and his confederates should immediately
follow with a bid so far above the true
value that no competition would venture
to increase it, the trap would be set. Default would be made upon the highest bid,
and the sheriff would then be obliged to
make a deed to the 'first bidder, although
he might have bid a grossly inadequate
price. Of course, if a fraudulent combination of this kind were proved, the sale
would be set asidp; but proof might not
be available, and even if it were often to be
had, a rule that may produce such inconvenience should not be permitted to exist." The learned judge also points out
that iutending purchasers, moved by considerations of friendship or business, often
stand aside in favor of the highest bidder,
while they would continue the competition if the next highest bidder seemed
likely to succeed. A re-sale in public gives
to such persons an opportunity of which
they are otherwise deprived.
In Swartzell v. Martin, spra,
it was
contended by counsel that the highest
Iidder having failed to comply with the
terms of sale, his bid was in fact no bid at
all, and therefore that the person who was
apparently the second bidder was really
the first bidder. This reasoning is clearly
fallacious, and the court rightly refused to
adopt it.
Upon both reason and authority, then,
we believe that the sale should be set
aside and the property offered again to
public competition.
Objection to confirmation of sheriff's
deed sustained.

GAMMON vs. JAMES.
Damages-Contract for sale of landSpecific performance.
HENRY and FENTON for plaintiff.
1. Where there is n6 unfairness on the
part, of. the vendor the value of the property sold with interest is the usual measire of damage. But where there has been
bad faith or deception there is no other
standard than the whole amount ofdamage
sustained and in this case the measure of
damages is the difference between the
price paid and the value of the property.
Bussy v. Donandson, 4 Dall. 207; Fulweilerv..Baugher, 15 Sarj. and R. 45; Hertzog v. Hertzog, 10 .Casey 428.
S. H. MILLER and SAULSBUsRY for de-

fendant.

The right to accept or refuse all bids was
a valid condition of sale for "A sale is
precisely what the vendor makes it."
Weast, Assignee, v. Derrick, 100 Pa. 509;
Poulson v. Ellis, 60 Pa. 134.
The damages, if any, is amount of purchase money paid with interest and expenses. Dumars v. Miller, 10 Casey 319;
Ewing v. Tees, I Binney 450.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. James died seised of a farm in
Clinton county, leaving to survive him a
wife and one daughter.
The widow and
daughter agreed to sell the farm and advertised the same and directed W. J. Collins a Justice of the Peace to act as their
agent and to attend to the sale of the real
estate, and draw up the conditions and
make settlement. The conditions of sale
were to the effect that ten per cent. of the
purchase money was to be paid on the
striking down of the property, the balance
in payments. Another condition was that
"the vendors reserved the right to accept
or refuse all bids."
The property was sold to C. L. Gammon for $5000.
He immediately gave
his check to the agent (W. 3. C.) in the
suni of $500, being ten per cent. of the
purchase money, and the same was accepted by him, and all seemed to be satisfactory to the widow and daughter at the
time.
About one week or ten days after tbis
was done the widow and daughter gave
notice to C. L. G. that they rejected his
bid, and gave him notice that they would
not accept the money, nor would they
consider the property sold. Thecheck remains in the hands of the agent.
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One mouth after this was done the
widow and daughter sold the same farm
to another party, Mr. Ropes, and delivered
to him at once a deed properly executed.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In this assumpsit, Gammon alleges a
breach by the defendants, of their contract
to convey to him a certain tract of land.
Sarah James had a dower interest in- this
land and her daughter, Rebecca, the other
defendant, was solely seised of it in fee.
They employed Collins to make a public
sale of it. He announced the various conditions, one of which required the payment
of ten per cent. of the price bid at once.
Another was to the effect that "the vendors reserve the right to accept or refuse all
bids."
Gammon's bid of $5000 was accepted by
the auctioneer to whom he immediately
delivered his check for $500. The James*
were present and seemed to acquiesce in the
sale. A week later, however, they notified
Gammon that they rejected his bid, and
would not accept the $500, the, check for
which still remained and remains in the
hands of the auctioneer. Ordinarily, the
highest bidder at a public sale has a right
to have the property upon which he bids,
at the price bid. The owner may, however,
fearing that the price bid will not be satisfactory, stipulate that he is to have the option whether to accept it or not. The stipulation was made by the James'. Gammon
knew, when he perceived that no other
bidder was going to outbid him. that that
circumstance would not entitle him to the
land, and that the assent of the owners
would be necessary. Collins ought then
to have learned whether the price wws satisfactory to his principals, and to have refrained from "knocking" the property
down to Gammon, until assured that it
was. As he was their agent, his conduct
warranted Gammon in inferring that they
accepted his bid.
But even if this act of Collins, and the
non-dissent of his principals were not a
final acceptance of Gammon's bid, we
think they were bound if they did not acquiesce, to express their rejection of his bid
in a very short time. A full week elapsed,
during which Gammon supposed that he
was the purchaser of the land. He had
given his check to the vendor's agent, and

during this time, had lost control of his deposit in the bank, expecting it to be withdrawn by the James'. The delay was
entirely too long. An unconditional sale
to Gammon had been in fact made.
A month after the attempted rejectionof
Gammon's bid, the widow and daughter
conveyed the same land to Ropes, who had
no notice of the previous contract with
Gammon. This conveyance has made it
impossible for the James' to convey the
land to the plaintiff, and a specific performance of their contract would therefore be
impracticable. Equity would not now
compel them alone, or them and Ropes, to
make a conveyance to Gammon; 22 Am.
& Eng. Encyc. 1018; Alvord v. Lane, 1
Forum 151.
Moreover, the contract to sell the land
to Gammon was in parol. Collins' authority to sell was oral, and the sale itself was oral. The statute of frauds makes
such a contract specifically unenforceable.
Bowser v. Cessna 62 Pa. 148; 1 Reed,
Statute of Frauds, 488; Harvey v. Thatcher,
28 W. N. C. 134. Nor has anything been
done in execution of the contract, which
would exempt it from the condemnation
of the statute. No possession has been
taken b.v Gammon of the premises. Peifer
v. Landis, 1 W. 392. A tenth of the purchase-money has Ileen paid, but neither
such payment, nor even a payment in full
without possession, would be effectual.
Becker v. Patten, 10 Pa. C. C. 643; Gangwer v. Fry, 17 Pa. 491; Bispham's Eq.
448.
But, although the oral contract will not
support an action for specific performance,
it will support an action for damages. The
money paid by Gammon with interest,
can be.recovered back. Had he with permission of the defendants, made improvements upon the premises, he could have
recovered their value. 2 Reed, Statute of
Frauds, 302; Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa.
43. There are cases in Pennsylvania,
which hold that no compensation can be
recovered by the parol vendee, for the loss
of the bargain, in the absence of fraud in
the making of the contract. A mere subsequent refusal to carry out the contract,
though wanton, would not be such fraud
as would entitle the vendee to the value
of his bargain. Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa.
174; Sausser v. Steinmetz, 88 Pa. 324;
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Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Pa. 384; Dumars
v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319; 2 Reed, Statute of
Frauds, 484. Cf. Bitner v. Brough, 11 Pa.
139. The statute would be of little value,
if refusal to convey, after making a contract orally proven, would impose on the
vendor the necessity of paying to the vendee the difference between the price which
the latter had agreed to pay and thelarger
actual market value of the premises. Had
Gammon incurred any expense in reliance
on the contract to convey, or in preparation for his consummating the purchase
and taking possession, he might obtain
reimbursement for it. He has shown no
such expense.
The relations of the two defendants to
the transaction are very different. Sarah
James had, and could release, only her
dower. Though they co-operated in the
sale, their interest was not joint. They
did not agree to do or to cause to be done
the same things. Rebecca bound herself
to convey the fee, Sarah bound herself to
simultaneously release her dower. The
damages ensuing from the breaches of
these promises, are not the same. If Rebecca refused to convey the fee, the release
of the dower would be made useless to
Gammon. It does not appear that the
widow induced the daughter not to keep
her contract, nor, if it had so appeared,
would it be clear that she would make herself responsible for the daughter's refusal.
The defendants however have, tacitly,
consented that they should be treated as
joint promissors.
The verdict therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, should be for the plaintiff for $500,
with interest from the time of payment.

The property owner made the contract
with the water company and was impliedly the guarantor of the tenant in his
payments to the company. A party cannot be deprived of the rightrof set off except by-express contract. Lloyd's Appeal,
95 Pa. 518.
PRINCE and REESE for defendant.
The tenant and not the landlord is liable
for water rent unless the lease contains
no express provision to the contrary. But
even if the landlord is liable, "One person
cannot without authority, pay the debts
of another and charge the amount against
the party for whose benefit the payment
was made. Am. & Eng. Ency., Vol.
XVIII, p. 187. There can be no set-off because there is no cause of action. Am. &
Eng.Ency. Vol. X, p. 213. Only such demands as constitute a subsisting cause of
action can be set off. Nothing can be
pleaded as a set-off on which a separate
action cannotbe maintained McCredy v.
Fay, 1 Watts, 496.
Voluntary payment of money under
claim, of right cannot, in general. be re.
covered back. To warrant such recovery
there must be compulsion, and the demand must be illegal. The element of
coercion is essential to the right. Colwell
v. Peden, a Watts 328; Kerner v. Bank of
U. S., 2 Pa. 237; Harvey v. Girard National
Bank, 119 Pa. 212.
STATEMEXT OF THE CASE.

Holmes let, for five years, a dwelling
house to Jacobs, knowing that he intended
to occupy it as such. The house had for
many yearsbeen connected with the mains
of the Water Uompany which supplied
water to the inhabitants of Lancaster. One
of the rules of this company, known toJacobs and Holmes, and expressly inserted
in all contracts between the company and
property owners, was that for any default
of any occupant, in paying the water rent,
the company might cut off the water from
the premises until such arrears should be
JACOBS vs. HOLMES.
paid. Before Jacobs took his lease, one
Hooper had been a tenant for a year, and
Landlords and tenants- Water rentsthe water-rent, $5, assessed on him, had
Set-off.
not been paid. After Jacobs had been in
possession under his lease for six months,
Action in assumpsit.
he was notified that the water would be
WEEKS and SCHUYLER for plaintiff.
A contract made by a water company, cut off, unless the $5 were paid at once.
to the effect that the water will be cut off Jacobs then notified Holmes, who, howunless payment is made for previous sup- ever, declined to pay. Thereupon, in order
ply is valid. Girard Life Ins. Co. v. to escape the loss of the water supply,
Phila., 88 Pa. 393; Commonwealth v.
Phila., 132 Pa. 288. Obligation of landlord Jacobs paid. This case stated is framed to
is to repair and if upon notice by the ten- determine his right to deduct the $5 from
ant, he refuses, the tenant can repair and the rent.
deduct same from rent, 12 Am. & Eng.
Ency. 727; 35 N. Y. 269.

THE FORUM.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The dwelling house rented by Jacobs,
is situated in a city of 40,000 inhabitants.
The only means by which the inhabitants
in such a city can procure water, is the supply of the Water Company. This particular house at the time of the lease was connected -with its mains, and the water
used by the occupants was received therefrom. When Jacobs leased the house, he
leased it as much on account of this wiater
supply, as on account of its roof, its windows, its yard, the number and arrangement of its rooms. He would no more
have agreed to hire it for the rental he was
to pay, without the water than without
the roof, yard, rooms, windows.
While the Water Company had no arbitrary power to cut off the water from this
house, it had by contract with its owner,
the right to compel him or its occupants to
pay all water rents or, on default of such
payment, to cut off the water. Philadelphia, which furnishes gas and water to its
inhabitants, makes similar contracts with
them. It has been held that it could compel a purchaser of a house to pay for gas
consumed in it before his purchase, or to
suffer the deprivation of the gas. Woods'
Estate, 15 W. N. C. 94; Commonwealth v.
Philadelphia, 132 Pa. 288. In Girard Lie
Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393, the
same was held with regard'to water.
As the water is-one of the expeceed advantages of the house, the deprivation of
it is in the nature of an eviction. Of a
lease of a furnace, -mill, etc., it was said,
I'That the right to the water was demised,
needs neither argument nor authority to
demonstrate, as it was just'as necessary to
the enjoyment of the estate as the. buildings or machinery." The state, under a
right secured prior to the lease, intercepted
the water. The lessor's covenant for quiet
enjoyment was thereby violated. Peters
v. Grubb, 21 Pa. 455. In Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Pa. 293, it was intimated that if a
right to light and air across a lot contiguous to the leased premises, was embraced
in the lease, the interception of them by
the erection of a building on the lot, would
be an eviction. The landlord's cutting off
the water from the house was treated as
an eviction which would justify the tenant in leaving the premises without pay-

ing rent, in West Side Savings Bank v.
Newton, 76 N. Y. 616; Cf. Smith v. Phila.,
81 Pa. 38, where the owner of a house got
damages from the city for depriving the
house of the water, and so making it impossible to rent it.
"Any act of the landlord which deprives the tenant of that
beneficial enjoyment of the ,premises to
which he is entitled uider the lease
will amount in law to an eviction and
suspend the refit." Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322. In Wood's Estate, &upra
the default of the grantor, in not paying
back gas rent, whereby it became 'necessary for the grantee to pay the arrears, in
order to retain the gas, was held to be a
breach of the covenants implied by the
words "grant, bargain and sell."
The stoppage of the water would have
been the act of the water company. But
it had a right thus to stop the water.
Considered as an eviction, its act would
not have been that of a trespasser. Indeed,
the right would have grown out of the default of the landlord, by his neglect to pay
the arrears of water-tax. In Grabenhorst
v. Nicodemus. 42 Md. 236, A leased to B
a ilistillery. The law of the United States
required the production by the tenant
of the written consent of the landlord
as a preliminary to the issue of a license
to distil. The refusal of the landlord
to give this consent, prevented the use
of the distillery. This was a constructive eviction, and discharged the lessee
from the rent, or entitled him to set off his
damages against the rent. Cf. Wood's
Estate, 6upra.
When the lease was made, Holmes impliedl y covenanted that Jacobs should
quietly enjoy the use of the water supply.
This covenant has been broken.
When there is a defect of title, or an encumbrance; by the assertion of which the
enjoyment of the premises is about to be
lost, the grantee"or lessee may buy in the
good title, or discharge the encumbrance
and he may as damages, in an action
upon thecovelnant, recover what he thus
pays. What he pays must be reasonable.
It cannot exceed the purchase money, or
probably the rental reserved. Hauck v.
Single, 10 Phila., 551; Large v. McClain,
7 Atlan. 101; Cox v. Henry, 32 Pa.- 18;
8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 176, 178,j183; Rawle
Covenants for Title, 293; Mllyers v. Broad-
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beck, 110 Pa. 198. But, what could be recovered, in an action on the covenant, can
likewise be set off against the rent. Tiley
v. Moyers, 43 Pa. 4u4; Peters v. Grubb, 21
Pa. 455; Prescott v. Otherstatter, 85 Pa.
534.
It the amount paid to avoid the disturbance of possession bore to the whole rent
a greater ratio than the value of the premises as enjoyed to their value as the lease
contemplated that they should be enjoyed,
it might be that the measure of damages
indicated would have tobe rejected. It0 is
not disputed, however, that the premises
without the water would be worth as
much less than with, as the rent minus $5,
is less than the rent. We are of the opinion that Jacobs may deduct $5 from the
rent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Hummel and H. Kistner obtained
judgment against Harry Evans andfi.fa's.
thereon were issued which came into the
sheriff's*hands at 9 A. Br. and 9.17 A. D. respectively, of June 13, 1895. Hugh Spangler sold some reapers to Harry Evans, who
represented himself as buying for the firm
of Harry Evans & Co. the other member
of which was his father, and a note by the
two Evans was given for the price, $1700.
There was in fact no partnership between
the Evans; but the father intended to acquire no interest in the reapers, and simply
to become, surety for his son, but this was
not revealed to Spangler. Spangler got a
judgment against the Evans and issued
an execution which came to the sheriff at
8.32 A. I. of June 16,1895. On these three
executions the sheriff levied on the reapers,
and the proceeds of the sale for distribution
HUGH SPANGLER vs. H. EVANS,
were $1250. Hummel's execution was for
et. al.
$327, and Kistner's, for $1017.
Auditor appointed to distribute.
Test of existence of partnership-Order
i1pangler claims precedence, as partnerof proceeds of sale on separate ft. fals. ship creditor.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
HOFFMAN and STEVENS for plaintiff.
Hummel'sfi. fa. came to the hands of
1. Parties holding themselves out is the sheriff, at 9 A. M., of June 13, 1895,
partners, are liable as such, though not
actually partners. Entwish v. Casey, 22 W. Kistner's at 9:17 of the same day, and
Spangler's on June 16th. The liens of exN. C 127.
02. One who holds himself cut, or ecution rank, in the order of their reachknowingly permits himself to be held out
ing the sheriff's hands. I Trickett Liens,
as a partner, on the faith of which others 324; 3 Id. 499. Kistner accordingly does
give credit to the firm, will be held liable
as such. Guyer v. Port, 155 Pa. 322; not dispute Hummel's right to precedence
Lancaster Co. Nat. Bank v. Boffenmyer, to him. Spangler however, not denying
162 Pa. 5.99.
the rule, contends that it is not applicable
3. Partnership creditor is entitled to to him because Evans & Co. -were a firm,
prec'edence over individual creditors. and as such, bought and owned the reapers.
Kane's appeal, 92 Pa. 273; Coover's appeal,
2§ Pa. 9; Stuart v. McHenry, 3 Phila. 340. and because his judgment is against' the
WALTER TAYLOR and W i. A. JORDAN two components of that firm for a firm
debt.
for defendant.
Upon aft. fa. by a creditor of a partner,
1. There is here anabsence of intention
to form a partnership, hence no partner- only his interest in the firm can be taken
ship exists, and Spangler is not entitled to and sold. The chattels themselves canthe proceeds of this sale as partnership
not be levied -upon. 1 Trickett Liens,
creditor. Cox v. Hickman, 8 N. L. C.
268; Parsons on Partnership, p. 47; Gill- 361; 2 Id. 500. If then the reapers were in
v. Kuhn, 6 S. & R. 333; Hart v. Kelly, fact firm property, and the judgmenm for
83 Pa. 286.
their price was a judgment against the
2. The proceeds of the sale of personal
property levied and sold upon these writs, members of the firn, as such, the execumust be appropriated to the writs in the tions of Hummel and Kistner did not beorder in which they come into the sheriff"s come liens upon them. Spangler's fi. fa.
hands. Shafner v. Gilmore, 3 W. & S. is the first and only lien thereon, and
438; Ulrich v. Dryer, 2 W. 303; McClelland
v. Singliff, 7 W. & S. 134; Brightly Pur- would be entitled to payment from the
proceeds.
don's Digest, Vol. 1, 12 ed. p. 839.
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There was, however, in fact no partnership between the Evans. Harry Evans
alone bought the reapers. They became
his. His father acquired no interest in
them. It would follow that the executions
would be liens in the order of their coming
to the sheriff, and that Spangler's ft. fa.
could not be paid until after those of
Hummel and Kistner, were it not that
facts exist which are alleged to tend to
show that the Evans gave out to Spangler
that they were partners, and so procured
the sale of the reapers. Do these facts justify the inference drawn from them?
Harry Evans represented that there was
a firm of Harry Evans & Co., and that he
was buying the reapers for it. But the
representation
of one cannot affect
another. Though, had the father estopped
himself from denying the existence of the
firm, Harry's representation would have
likewise estopped him, Spangler knew
that Harry's representation could neither
make the father a co-partner, norpreclude
the father from denying that he was such.
Did the father, then, do anything to estop
himself? He simply wrote his name below or above that of his son, on the note,
with the intention to become surety. He
did not know that the son had made the
representations which he in fact made.
His signing the note cannot therefore involve him, towards Spangler, or others, as
a partner. To say that it could, would be
to say that if B signs A's note, in order to
become surety, he also becomes partner if
A has, without his knowledge, told the
payee that they were partners. The burden is upon Spangler to show all the facts
necessary to support his claim. One of
these is the father's knowledge of Harry's
representations. Without such knowledge
the father's signing of the note could not
be construed into a representation that he
and Harry were partners.
But, even had the father so acted as to
estop himself as respects Spangler, from denying the partnership, his act could not
affect Hummel and Kistner. These were
not responsible for it. The reapers were
bought by Harry Evans. Theyin fact belong to him. Why then are they not to
be permitted to appropriate them to their
debts? They have done nothing to deprive
themselves of the right secured to them by

'

law, to levy upon and sell their debtor's
property, and to receive payment from the
proceeds in the prescribed order.
The reapers, it is true, had been Spangler's. He alleges that he sold them to the
firm, and not to Harry Evans. It might
be that, were this so, he could annul the
sale and recover the reapers in specie, on
the ground of fraud or of mistake on his
part as to the identity of his purchasers.
But, his execution affirms the sale. It
tacitly asserts that the reapers are not his.
If they are not his, they are Harry Evans'.
The father of the latter acquired, and intended to acquire, no interest in them.
The right of a creditor of A and B,
alleged by him to be members of a firm,
to levy on property, as firm property,
depends on the ownership in fact of both
A and B. If as between A and B, the
chattels are A's, B has no equity to require them to be applied to the joint
debt.
When the father chose to become surety of the son, he chose to acquire no control over the reapers. The
son could dispose of them as he wished.
He could convert them into money and,
with it, pay Hummel and Kistner. The
right of a partnership creditor to be preferred with respect to property, depends
on its being in fact, firm property, which
each partner has a right to apply to
firm creditors in preference to individual creditors. The creditor's privilege is
that of subrogation to the partner's privilege. The partner having none, neither
has the creditor. The facts which estop
two men from denying a partnership between them as to a creditor, do not estop
the creditors of either from denying it.
York County Bank's Appeal, 32 Pa. 446;
Bixler v. Kresge, 169 Pa. 40.5; Scull's Appeal, 115 Pa. 141; Himmelreich v. Shaffer,
182 Pa. 201. In Walter's Appeal, 1 Chest.
278, there was an actual partnership. The
case does not decide that, had there
been only an estoppel on A and B against
denying their partnership, creditors of the
supposedfirm would have been preferred to
creditors of the member of the supposed
firm whose the chattels levied on in fact
were.
The auditor was correct in awarding the
money to Hummel and to Kistner. Exceptions dismissed.

